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6. Complex Individuals: The Individual 
in Non-Euclidian Space 
John B. Davis 
INTRODUCTION - THE RECENT CHANGE IN 
ECONOMICS 
Economics is widely ••• n s. oeocl ... i~1 economics, whoso COTe is dIe idea 
of mtional self-inter •• ted individuals interacting in markets. Yet when one 
cooduclS a tonsus of kinds of rescoren beina published in "l""ding' 
oconomi •• journals OVIIJ' the last three decades One find co""id.l3bt.. prima 
Iucio cvidCllce IIlat a 001 insignificant share of this work employs non-
neoclasSical types £If thoorizing, tools lII1d methods of o:mpiricaJ analysis, 
whorcu in the Un' tbrce pOSIWar decades that !!hare was far mutller. If 1\111: 
•• tends thi~ empirical inV •• tiistion to journal birtbll in the las! three decade,. 
one find ••• idence lbae non .... ncl .. sical journal birtbll significantly .xceed 
neoc~ ••• ical joOJrn8l birtllS. implying (with lBr fewer joum,1 deaths over lite 
&aIM period) Illat nem-neoclassical r_arch appears to b •• rising share of 
whot i. being published ill economics journal. as a ,,,hole. Further. 
concoptual .valualloll of IDIIch of this NCenl non-neoclassical res .. rclt 
indicate. Ibat it has origins alJf$de oCeconomlcR in other science •• and thus il 
imports il110 ecODOlllics .ssumptions from Ibe... other sdmc.. about lite 
noture of scientific explaulllion and about hew to cooceive the object of 
investigation in economia: IIlat de",," from wltat u!1derlies canvonlional 
IIe<lcl.s.ical views (Davis, 200&). Wltile it is po5llible thai this prOCI!S& might 
ullimatloly eliminate """nomic, as • distiDet domain DC invl!Sligation in the 
future, the: mn,e likely JlDSl'ibility given economic.' historical ability to 
absorb other ""ionee coo!eDls in the ~ •• t (Mirowski. 1989; Blaug. 2003), is 
that economics' s&ape aruI ohjcctiw. will b. IIlm,forll1e<i, bOlt Ibol it will 
broadly remain R scien"" of human interaction, pltJduction and cxcl!.nge. 
Vel under litis vcry genera! description a wid. range offramowork. can be 
imagined, and this invites lIS to ask bow the now l!JIIlI'o.ches now boing 
purGUed in economics target th. fundamentalo .. umptiQllS ofsta!1dord theory. 
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Indeed many of these asswnptions, lang takm for granted and thus rarely 
enmined, are c •• t into .tark relief in ar!!WD<'nl. that begin with different 
.larting points ill the new approache,. Arguably as fundamontal 8S allY of 
those .. awnptions in sl4ndml theory arc tho.. I'Cgarding the natw"e of 
eoonomic agenl., who are conventionally lalren to be human indi.idu81s all 
of •• senti.Uy tbe same lrind of make·np, and who arc thus aU taken 10 behave 
in essentia.lIy the Sllfn8 woy across their many different pos:;,ible furrns Df 
interaction. This dual conception - like individuals aod like rorm. of 
interaction - i. challeoged in mlll1y receot evoluliollary-<:omplexity-
computational .ccounts of Ihe ecooomy that alternatively suppo.e that 
individual economic agents and their mrnl. of interaction are inescapably 
he.erogeneous. Indeed for some the stimulus for this differeot vjew of 
individuals ties in their perceplion that replacing the standsrd conception of 
tlte itldividuBI is key to developing uew economic understanding. For 
example, K.ilm'" (1997) traces the breakdown of momalic general 
equilibrium theory, particularly as associ.1ed with the Sonne.schein-Manlel-
Debr.eu results, to the standard view of the rndividual. and argues fD~ a new 
approa.h to individuals "" ""ntrlll to now fo""" of ecoD.mic tberuy. What 
then might be the b •• i, ofouch an altemalive dual conception of individuals? 
On" explanation of tb. heterogeneity DC .goot, and inte.rnction advanced in 
evolutionuy-complexity-colllputatioDal approaches derives ftom ao 
alt_aliv. co.ception of spIC. !:bat rejects Ihe classical vjew of space ~s a 
real field that operares in noooI85510;5111. The stalldard ",.1 field or Euclidian 
view treat. '1'.00 as uadiffe,entiated except by arithmetic measure. Non-
Euclidian views Df spaoe~ particularly B!' developed far economics and soda! 
science (see F,.lIken, 2006), are often elaborated usin~ altemative 
II1.themati.al nlC!hods sn<h -as graph theory to investigate structures of 
network relation.hlps betw ••• agents, thus further differentiating space by 
identifying positious specifi< to particular networlu. and according 10 specific 
struotural relationship' between ",,!works. In contrast to the obwdJml reol 
field view of space in which ~ou can always gil from one point to another 
with the only issue being the arithmetio distance botwo ... tho •• points. in 
non-real ,pRoe on. often CllIIIIOt get from one PDint !O another, bccnu~e 
conDettiallS or pathway~ do not exilt for doing so betwoan different 
structural locations. This introduces 'ilTeverBibllities' into the actioDB of 
.genls, and more geD£'.Uy malms it possible 10 ttc.t .gem and thoir 
interactions as heterogeneous by virtue of their dift'c:ret1l IIlcatiolis nDd 
oanespondingly different opportuoilies for interactiDD. One questiOD it rai.o. 
is whether this is enough to eKplain iooividuals as hctecolleoeous and noo-
atomistic. Anotlter questioll it raises is wltether an evolutionary-complexity-
computational viow aftbe world is possible without. noo-atomi,tic account 
of individuals. 
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llIi. chapter Iii"""'.... Ibe dilferono.. helwcon neoclassical and 
.l/OIUlionary-compl."ity-computational .iewa of indi.id..... and thoir 
interaction in terms of their differenl underlying acCOlDIlB of spece. The two 
COIltl'Mliog accounts of the individual are termed !he atomisric view and the 
relatiooal views. The second section of the <b.~r bt,ms by further 
distinguishing the field and non-field concepts (If space, comment. on how 
they fiSllre in fee ... 1 debates in e'YOwtionary biology in terms of competing 
inlcrpte!ationa uf Ibe idt:a of. fitDIOss landscape, and thell ties IlUs to Neent 
evoJutionaty-eomp)exity-coD1pulalion.1 appmacbe<' somewbat mixed 
n:jection of the cl .... i",,1 view of spoce .. a field. 'Ihe third aec\iQn argues 
that this altemativ. uodcrsl.lldiDg of space implies a relational conception of 
the individual, ond Ib.t lb •• tandard atomistic individual.,.",.,eption emplDYs 
a Euclidian understanding of spac. I chsl1lclcrize the individual in the 
relational conception 11$ a compl.x individuli. The fourth section introduces 
the ovolutionary-<omplexily-computalional approach to individuals known as 
agent-based modelling. and thoa crilieatly evnluates the inlerpretation (If this 
approach, Pons (2000) provides attempts to combine non-Euclidi.n 
goornetries of speco with. """ception of individual, as heterogeneous. I 
argue Iha~ despite his lIoll-Euclidian tum. h. still Ir .... individuals lIS 
homogeneous, thus showing that escaping the alomistic conception ICquires 
tying the hehlrugoruoit, of individuals diroctly to their relations to 0"", .ooth~ 
rather tha" to such Ihing8 as peth-dependence and thei{ dillerenl locations in 
a diffonmtiatod space. The fifth ,celion ..... an ilic:ntily lIlI&lysjg 10 /iu1Itcr 
."Piain compl"" individual., diotinguishing between individual identity .lind 
personal identity, tyina the former ""neep! to how indi.iduals are ChltDgM by 
,ocial mtenlCtion nnd tbe L,lter concept to their being lIClf-orgonizing, 
refloxive accnl3. TbJ. owrall vlew of individual. is applied to Mrrowsld's 
(2007) 'markomaca' complllational view of rrwkets. lind it is argued that 
Iogcther they provide an 1IlidetSlllnding of marke4s and individnal. .s 
inrerlinkcd and everywhere cDmpleo: and div .... c. 'The sixth section closes 
with bri(lf ccmtllents about social economic policy towards individunls on 
this Utlderstanding_ 
TWO GEOMETRIES OF SPACE 
Complexity economics is the invcstipticu Df lWn-linear dynamics of 
economic syatems made up "f hellOrogflllC .... agenl!l exhibiting co-evolving 
ex~ectations. MiroW3id (2007) Ira""" the origin. of complexity-
computntiona' approaches in eoonomics to the gmdual ablUlrlonm.nt of 
physic. a. the chier model for scientific .. pla~ntion in economics, and tbe 
cmtrgence of the sciences of computation and evululiooory biololD' ;as 
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alternative models for ecooomie .Kplonation. Enrly IIflocta.sicalutility theory 
wos modelled 00 Euclidian field tileD!), nnd the energy metaphor of L,te 
olneleeoth century cla,sic.l mechuni"" and has [argely susraioed this image 
for a centwy (Milowski, [989). fundamental to this coneeptioD i& the idea rrf' 
r.al space. R". under.tood as • well-defined given field or metric in which 
any on. point can b. rel • ..,d 10 any other, such .. embodied in the standard 
deoclassica.l notion of the economy as .a. homQgeneous. continuoul 
commodity space in which illdividual agents have demand. and supplies for 
all goods whallo.ver, and no part of the economy is partitioned off, 
inaccessible. or can be said to be near or distant. I Whil~ the real field concqlt 
of ~pacc ii intuitive and familiar in mBth~mRf:ics ali the generalimtion Df 
arilhmetic, all!"br., and .5 the foundotioll of the integral and diffcrenija[ 
calculus, it is hardly the only oonoept or geometry of space or under.lnnding 
of economic space. Grapb IbeoIY (.ee Ellel1l1AD, 1984: Kinnon, 1987; 
Mirowski. 1994) offers on alternative geometry of .pace based on the ide. 
that system. can b. oonceived "fin te""" of set of elements (orvertic.s) nod 
diff • ....,t combiDatiODS af comections (or edges) between them th.t tnakc it 
po •• ible to speale of "neighborhood.' of .Iemenl!;. Sinee aU neighborhoods 
are not colDltcted to one other, neilher are all their elements. Varyiog degrees 
of inaccessibility from any giVOll point 10 particular neighborhoods 
accordingly mokes it pos.ible to oxplain space in terms of the conoephi of 
neam... and d;stan«. Further. adding hierarchies of neighborhoods 
sene,.olios high.r-lov,,1 sY."'lIIJj (hyp."'lrucl ...... or syslI!ms Df sr.tom,) a"" 
extend thi!l bUlc idea by representing systems themsr:lvcs a9 the elements 
having different CODlle<:tiOns to one nnoth"" .s iIlustraled ill Simon's 
decomposable modular deckioD-making syslems for organizations (Simon, 
1962). 
Arguably the analogue of re.1 space in evolutioDOl)' biology ;. the idea of 
a -Ii""' .. 11DllI ••• pe d.fiood. ind"l'ondeutly of the evolutioruuy pmcesses that 
occor within it, which thus lacks 'neighborhoods' or other as}'IMIetries that 
reflect particular evolutionary processes ongoing in that given space, seen lIS 
if it were a oeutral container. Similarly, in standlird economies, that ,II goods 
are substitutable for one anoth..r in agent choice means tbat neil!hbarhcods 
do not exist in real tonuncdily space. In tOllllast, the idea of there bemg 
'neighborhood" in which mutation and .eleclion occur .m,di.ely d~lines 
"'Poce in terms Df tI,eso cvolutioll3lY pmcc..... Thus a nwnbcr of recent 
contributors to evolutionmy biology begin from the ide .. thot the concept of 
space is inseparable from the concept of behavior, i. therefore structured 
according to the disnib"t;on of di(f .. ",nt types of behavioral agents, and then 
ex:amincs how the processes of mutation and selection oparatc along 
pathways which ore irrcversible and unique. reflecting the existence of 
'neighborhoods' in which. different kind. of agent. happen to b. located 
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(F"Rlana, 2003). 
Many reoent. evoluliooaly-complexily-compulatiolll!! approachos <haw in 
one way or another on evolutioDal)l mel.ph"r., but do so with differing 
d_woes or seositiviiy [0 the dilTorence between Euclidian mel nan-EuclidilUl 
concepts of space. Even in accounts Ihat empha'i2<> tbat space is 
heterogeneous and differentiated, there is still often • teodency Iil think of 
thi9 'non-Euclidinn" space o.s fl givan space in tM form ofn 'sDc.ial ecoPlomiQ' 
fitne •• landscape, T suggest that on. possible reason for this mixed 
understanding lies in a vestigial attecluuont to the .,omiotic cODception of the 
individual. Most _approaches replace Ihe standard prefereoce cOll<eprion of 
the iIldividual witb a cbaracleri .. tion of the individual in terms of search 
alaorithms, in order to explain behavior as involving travel across a 
beleroseuODus landscape, This appeam to involve a non-subjec!ivist sort of 
characterizatiDn of individuals - tbus B non-a.lomistic on~ - bUL the idea. of 
,,,arch i. easily "",oeialed with the idea of •• arch aero,", a given lanclscape. 
alb.i! a differ.nliated one. That i .. the idea thaI Ibe .pace lIIId the behavior of 
agents is joilltly con,/inlling i. missing also, implying that not only i •• pace 
not B IivCl\ (in whatever form), but that neither are the charaeterioli"" of the 
individual. I .trem~t to m.ke thi. point ct •• rer in the neKt •• etien'. 
comparisoll of Ibe atomistic CIIn~prion of the individual with what [ take to 
be its genuine alternative, 2 relational ,,,,"c"PtiOD. 
TWO CONCEPTIONS OF TIlE INDIVIDUAL 
The two geometries of spa.o, the Buclidiao and non-Euclidian, I argo., imply 
two diffiorent conception. of individuab_ The cl ••• ic Euclidian fi.ld concept 
of re.1 apace supports "" atomistic conception of the individual, wh"", .. the 
various po,sible nOll-liuclidian concept, of SP"'" support " relational 
cooception of the indi.idu,ll. III the ca<:e of the field concept, since space is 
homogeneous alld continuolIs, no place witl1in it can be distinguished from 
OlIy o.her, ClCCOpl by being arithmetioally distant from aome arbilrarily riven 
point The charaoler of ""ace, then, do~ nat i.self distiDgu;,1l onlitie. of my 
kind from ooe 11Iother, so that they cannot but be defined hoth strictly in 
term. of .hemselve. and also i~ the <.Ome way - or u indistinguisbable .!oIllS. 
Non-Euclidien space, in eontrut, i. diff"",ntiated hy virtue of patterns of 
eonnectioDS betweeD sets of elements, so that tbese elements, or whatever 
typos of entities they may be, must differ in kind according the differeot 
combinations of connection. they have !o other elements. Entities in non-
EuolidiJm space, that is, a<o <ample" ill virtue of baving differeDt kinds of 
relations to other entities, which are them.elves similarly complex. Such 
entiti •• cannol ther.fore be selC-cQlltained .toms. and are IIlIlS neither defined 
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<tric~y in Ie!IIlS oftbemsclve. oor all in the oaOle w"dy. 
In th. alomistic contoption, since alIIms are e.s.ntially •• If·ooDlaiDed 
enlitie. that ore cOfIIJIl&e in themoelves. individuals thus understood are 
analogously defined strietly in Ienn. of their own ch8(8Cteri.tics and .U in 
terms of the •• me kinds of chara<larisl1u. Accordingly the domlnant 
interpretation of the individual in economics - the ncocl...,ical alQmistie 
conccptio.a - defines all individuals: solely in mnrl!l of thei.r own pre£etences 
(whether defined in psychological ~rms in the cl ... icol cardinal and ordinal 
utility tradition Dr more fonnally iD Samuolsonian rov ... led pr.fe......,., terms 
as a binary relationship bet"'"" rankinll sys~m.) and Ibeir own (Savag.· 
ba,ed) .ubjecti •• e"Pceraliaas, both of which constitute characteristic. aflh. 
individual thol require no ,.,ferenee 10 olher individual •. As Ihe familiar f.ble 
hBs i~ Rnbinson Cruso. wos n complete man on hi. d ... ert island berorc 
friday arrived, would bave remained one had Friday never .nived, 000 
indeed remained one after he did. 
In contrast to thi_ and other atomistic concepliom of th .. individual, 
relational coru:eptions of the individual define individuals in tenos of their 
reLotionships Lv and communication wiili oilier individuals, Dr more 
accurately in lel1ll!l of their different sets of relalionships to and differ.ot 
forms of communication wilh alb .... individuals. IDdeed, on the relational 
conception indi.iduals ""Mill be defmed in isolation wilhout wlllcrmininS 
Iheir "horaeleri%.tion as individuals.' InbJiti"ely, !h. simple idea underlying 
the relati""a[ cunception i. thai 9umolbing .'unol b. attributed Ihe &talUs of 
beLng an entity or individual ..ctes. it CAn bc .hown 10 b. distinct from a like 
thing; that is, it i. 'individUll!ed' by compnrison 10 a like thing. In non· 
Euclidian space. this simple point is compmmded, as it wen:1 since 
individuals are positioned in spa •• by virruc of having cODrulClilJllll 'to many 
individuals who they are like in different WRYS. CODsequeotIy their 
individuality is the resnlt of their being individuated in different ways. But as 
their different cOIJDcclions 10 olh=rs 8~ a fu~tion of iodividWlIs boing 
differently positioned in space, thei, different connections to olhets are 
generally ineollllllell5urable. Individuals tllus undentood must be complex in 
that - despile being Wlilary entities - they are made up of iDcornmeJlSWable 
CbuaCteriStiL" . .Acconliogly Ihe: n:lational CDIII:eption of individual. must be 
an account of campi"" individual •• 
One •• BIIlpl. of a relatioDal con •• ptiou [Jf the ivdividual i6 the collective 
intcntianslity occounl of mdivid •• ls. which treats the individual's capacity 
for forming sbared we-inlention ••• an iJ1dividuating characleristic of 
individuats that can be exercilied in multiple contexts (sec Gilbert, 1989; 
Tuom.la. 1995; na.i., 2003). The simple principle of individuation it 
omploys i. that individual. are individtJ.tcd rel.Ii •• to others they are like in 
virtue of the belief they bave thot • possible w&-intention is shared.] But !be 
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abundance of forms and occasions in which we-intenlion& are exprelsed 
differentiates individll4l. from other individuals in multiple way •. Though 
proponeDIS r>f Mlleoth,. intentionolity theory do not explicitly employ any 
particular conception of space, their conception of individuals C8IIIIot bot he 
complex in light .. ftbe beterogen~. na~ ofwo-inlentia .... What, tbep, of 
Robinson Crusoc? In Ibis particular relalional conception, since individuals 
are w.tderstood to have a c:apaeity COT forming we-illlc:ll.cion~ CrumlC can only 
b. aD individuaJ, becawc Friday i. possible, whether Priday ever IllIives on 
Ihe island, since Crusoe needs the po ... biJity of Fridoy, or rather many 
Fridays, co he able to form we-inl.nlions. Crusee, then, i. a complex 
individ"AI, not a simple, self-ccmtaincd individual, boc ...... he i. made up of 
relalioD' to many differenl Fridays, 
The contrast between Ill<> "'omi,tie ""d relationol CClDCeptions of the 
individual can be made shatper by eompadog thelr respecdvo tre&lIru:nts of 
differences bctwccf! individuals. In the atomistic conceplion, Ihough 
irulividll.1s can be different in having different preferenetS and expectations, 
nothing in this ctlllception requires it, so that !hey can in principle all have 
identical preferences BOd expect.lion., Ar. lhey still di.tinct individuals'/ 
Representative ageAt models efl;'cll".ly 111. thi. identity to treal many 
individuals as olle individual, implying that Ibe d;m,r""".. between 
individuals are irrel-=vamt BuL sLlCh modli:lls ellD be shO'Nll to be Il!8ny one-
agent madel. (lGrman, 1992). In the argument here, they nre not OVllll Ihnt 
Since in the relational conception individual, musl be different from ,els of 
other like individu.l. 10 =<iot as individuals, the soliwy representative 
individual by definition cannol even exist as on individual, but rather operateS 
••• faux construct for the nrulerlying nead ••• ica! mode' ( .... d clos. kin 10 
another mythical ageDt, the Walrasian auctioneer). This all raises an 
interesting question: if individuals in the relational cooceplioo are s-. •• 
complex individuak who are all different ti"om ODe aDother. is it possible 10 
sey anylhing about tbem in general other Ihan lhat they are all diffeceztl from 
one anothetl I win argne lhatlh<:re is indeed one important thing we can say, 
namely, that tbc:y are reflexive cnLilie •. But before dDing !o. and for pwposes 
af contrast. in the next section I review Polls (20011) ap·bascd "",deling 
aeculm! oJ individuals, ond alglle that, de'pite his intention III break with the 
atomistic irulividual CDnGep/ioo, he .liU end. up treatiDg individuals as 
bomog.neo •• IIIId undifferentiated. 
l\'EO·EUCLIDIAN AGENT BASED MODELING 
Agent·b •• ed madelins, as a part of ogent-b .. ed eoonpoto.tionai economics, 
consists of ft variety of eamputational methods used to simulate ""d 
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investigate the properties of dynamic systems of different kinds of 
autonomous 'gents who interad .«arding to differnnt set. Df dod.ioo rules 
(sc< T .. r..t.icn, 2006). Where .. in iraditiDllBl geneml equilibrium models 
agent interaction is indirtct. and il mediated by 8 price coordination process 
that operalco!hrough lb. artificial device of a Walra,;an ""dioneer, in agent-
booed models individual. inleract directly with one anoth ... according to bow. 
rm t:X1lw.ple:. IL.ClllUIt:s fm I:Il::qu.iLillg 1lIu! ~upJ..lly.in~ gllods nmtctl Up'- Ascuts 
are also seen to learn from their intemctioDK with othen, and then change 
their deci.ion rules ""cording to simple revision procedU1"cs, such os 
reillfurcement [earning. Becau •• system. of such agents exhibit emergent 
properties that are not properties of the agents themselves, they are known as 
compl.,. adaptive syAtems. Agent-based COIlIputarional economies and ag<!nt-
based modeling have aeconiingly often been characterized a ... 'bollom-up' 
or 'culture dish' approach, since all aggregate patterns of bebavior are 
explained ill t~rms of individual int.ractiollS. At the .ame time, the emergent 
properties of complex adaptive systems also produce feedback effects 00 
individual behavior, so that micro bohavior and maCIO system or aggregate 
regularities oporate as a two-way slreet. 
Agent-bo'ed modeling is Cannulated in lerlllS of COU-EllClidian space in 
virtue of ibl representation of agents 38 directly interclcting with Dne anollicr. 
In standard equilibrium mcdels) the existeD~e of thf! WaIraSlian auenoncer 
crealo, a real .paco in which all agents' domands and supplies are related 10 
one anothor thiOiigh the medium of the cquihbrium price vector. Minn. the 
auctioneer, individuals and their demands ODd suppliea are DO longer all 
related to one Bnother, ." that which iodividuahI they are modeled.s directly 
interacting with effectively oreates the space in which they act - " space 
wlUch is accordingly differenrilled IlIld uneven. This non-Euclidian view of 
the space of agent inleraction, when underStood dynamicBlly requires I1Iat the 
paths individuals take aCIOSS • sequence of inleractions be seen .. 
heterogeneous os weU. Thus individuals, il lullow., must also be 
heterogeneous. In effect, path-dependency, as ... aspeot of modeling ag<!nt 
behavior in n()ll-EuclidiOll space. explains the nature of individuals. 
Potts adopts this general fill_work, argues explicitly for abandoning 
Euclidian real space as necessary fDr progress in eoonomic91 lind regards the 
agent-bosed ooropulatiooa! conception of the individual as an advance on the 
atomistic conce.,tion. He formul.teo his view using graph theory, as 
developed by 'theoretical hiologists and systems ecologists: and considers il 
• method of analysis able 10 provide a 'univ .... al framework for the study of 
oomplex systems' (Pon.,l()OO. SSfI). citing Klwflinen. a theM.tical biologist 
attached to Ibe Santa Fe Inotitl1le. and author of the influential The Origi ... of 
Ordor: Self-Orgoniralion and Selection in EVDlution (1993), .. a key 
contributor. The main impUcation of this approach for oU! thiDking about 
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individ\lals, Potts argues, is Ihat individu.ls need In b. IreBted lIS 
heterogeneous, And indeod h. recommends we adopt the label of H~lero 
l!COIIomklls for his IlJ!CIll-basM modeling conception of the individual. .But i. 
the sease in which Potts underswuls individuals 10 be beICrogeDeo1l8 
sufficient to distinllllish his view of the individual fimn th. atomistic view1 
What we find, ilIUm" out, i. that d"pite tbe ract that graph tbeory allow. 118 
tu IlH,ik. L41UU ~tiLi.::1S. ar. (elated lD cth.:r c:nntlcs i.a .D.olghboIhoods and 
networks, Potts do .. not omploy 8 relational conception of the individulll, 
and indeed goes on to derm. individun16 a"'1Ili6tically entirely in isolation 
fmm .U other individuals, remarkably even employing tb.lradilionaJ imago 
of Robinion Crusoe to motivate hi& 'new' type of understanding. 
W. begin willi just • aingle 8.11<nl \I. an efflironme'" .klcked with '1050111''':' eft 
R.obin.on en. .... ralmuillian, as ruch). The model is !hen inilially of two sets -
an cnv.ironmellt £tate ". aoc:t an agent resouree sct II - when: we shan initially 
delm.. JI" IS an in~ni'" •• 1 of eI.m ..... in !he CIIVirooment Ii'om which we draw a 
..-1 a.. lhe .... u,oe elements held by tbe IIgIIllt (polts,lOOO, 114). 
The sci JI" represenls all 'n.two's endcwlUeql$' f,om which. the agent 
rCSOttfCt: set V for our CRobinson CruSDI:! ... miGht represenl CIWDS) rocksl 
firewood, coconut! and suchlike' (114). Crus",,'s problem, then, is to 'find 
the good combinRtions' of the •• rc.oource., hy ""gaging in a process of 
'a~perirne!ltalion by combination, """"'hing through the 9pftCe of po-,slbiliti .. 
for useful tomhio!tiOllS' - at a 'search in arate-spoee' (liS), How are the 
different combilllltions evaluated as 'good' Of not? 'We may ... suppose that 
the !gem's ranldnas of these teChnologies i. an .,.pr ... ioo of the .geat's 
prefereuces,' whic1. we leam '.", engaged only aft ... all tcdmologies have 
b •• " sampled' {I 16). Thus, Potts's lIIf!UIPeni is that since different Crusoes 
have different locatiDIII in space, and since IlOIl-Euclidian spue is 
differartiat..d, agents ore beterogern:all>l in lut.viog diffiorellt lc<atiollS. BUllbi. 
does DDI. ten us that Il\ey arc dltrerenl in any impor1ant respect in tlu!mselv •• , 
and indeed Potts treals individuals - a1beil in their differ.1l1 locations - as 
being all essentially tbe same type of agents. Thot is, they lIe homOlleJleoU! 
ag""~ who appear to b" ditrerl!!lt by being located in differedt plac ... 
Pn!l!l make. this clear wheo h. giv •• us the definition of HeJ8rfJ 
2~onolHj,u.' as 80 algorithmic mm, meaning an agont that employs a 
sequential sel of operations or rulcs Ai. decision algorilhm, 'whicb we may 
suppose In be aD ioa.1e property of an lnton<>11IOIIS agent' that CBn be 
Connally reJI"",ented ll. (117), 
<r~ - <LIST: CONSTRUCT, RANK: SELECl> (\'otis, 2000, 117). 
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More generolly, the agent is defined as 8 set of resources, • 'et of behavioral 
algorithms, and a selected 5et of technologi... The agent is indeed a 
bOlJlldedly rational agent in thelnldition of Simon (1959) and more recently 
Holland (1995), bee."". ab.ndOTling F.lIclidianism implies thai the reacll of 
agent behavior nn longer e.lend5 In resOllfce~ at ooy poiot in sp.ce. 
Individual. are bOWldedly Talional, because their cognitive abilitie, only 
operate on objects in their immediate neighborhoods. Bounded rationaUty. 
however, is not octo.l1y • property ofiodividuals on this interpretation, but 
rnther a property of !he locations that individual. occupy - a bounded view or 
perspective - in a differentiated and aaymmetric spice. The same thing can 
be .aid about th. ways in which individual. "",i.e and adopt their diffi:reot 
decision roles as they travel through dm.rontiated spac •. Different rules are 
adopted as tbe result oftmvelinglhrough specific sequences oftueKlions in 
space, DDf because of inherent limitations of individuals, but because they 
only onoouoter speeitie Iaeation •. Thu. any agent who travels D given path 
would adopt Ibe some decision rule., and accordingly nil individunl. are the 
same type of homogeneous agents who e.a~h eJ:hibit the same 'innate 
property of an Autonomoos agent.' 
Note, then, that in Potts', pceount thus rar Friday has yet to arrive on the 
seen.. How will things be influenced by Friday's arrival? Nothing, we 
unfortunately learu, i. really changed by the addition of other individuals, 
and in fact othor individual. turn out to simply be Dpportuniti •• tor Crusoe to 
locate new sets of ",.0=.. that were previously inacce.sible to him. Ju 
Potts (2000) .ays, 
The: problem Ih.a.f agents nnw race is the decisi(ln of which o~ agent to interact 
{vlth. rt seems Jeasonable to presume that intera(;tiIon between asehtli will be 
engaged 8!1;cording to the same logic Ily which dle age-D.t inl.e~lS will. UI~ 
eaviromnent (125) 
More fully, IlDW 'th. agee!', environment [also] cOllSi!t. ofth. re.ouree. and 
technology sets of ath .... @I'D": which when ·somehow displayed to our 
Crusoe. en tile oecasions of their inl"".ction, trigger tlt"", to record th. 
locationo of these other r.,ources (following !he analysis of Holland) with 
.... g •• given to each other. Should any CfUiOe'. togs match tags created hy 
other Crul!lOCI!IJ then an e.xchange of,e~ources becomes possible that increases 
Ihe re,ource. Available to all (126J. That is, .U CtU8oe's Fridays are but 
oec1l..iono for new .ombin.collS of 'clams, rockl. firewood, coconuts and 
.uchlik.: a. well as application of tlte new technologies different Fridays 
have tor Ibeir combin.tioD. In sucb circwnst8l1ces, Potts tells us, a 
'multiagenf' can b. mONd. such as i. uDderstood as • firm or a household in 
stondard ecoDomics (129), which if ltable, merges the preferences of the 
different illdMdualo into 'a ,ingle ,ch"matic prererence' (130). This re-
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produces. Helen) e.t:.onamicJls un II more general level as a complex system., 
hul except for the added tagging systom .s an account of agent interactioo, 
there is nothing r.ally different in this view of Ibe agell! from our original 
Crusoe. All ageDIS .re homogeneous WI sclS of resources, algorithms, and 
(now) lIP, and differ merely by having different combin8tiClM of these, 
which is the ",,,,,II of Ibeir di ffcrenl path, through a differenti.ted space. That 
is, there i. nothing In the appearance of Friday .. ' anolller individual that 
changes elWiOe (or Friday). 
N on-Euclidian space and path-dependence, Ilterefore, are not lillfficient '0 
produc" real agent hetorogetlllity. Potts's Crusoes are not aDly defined all in 
the .ame way, but their con""'. with Ih.ir Fridays do"",, not chan&e their 
nature. Indeed Potts's Crusoe does nat meet a Friday as B differeUI type of 
individual, bUljus. another Crusoe. Individuals ar. still aU defined in terms of 
their own chara.cteri.,tics, or atnmisneaUy, demon,tratiog th.t a oon-Euclidian 
space joined to • standard view of the individWlI only end! up pradtJeing an 
essentially neo-Euclidian understanding of social space. I ,u!:!!"_t, then, that 
if we are to develop a genuinely evolutionary-eomplexily-computational 
.pproach to .00ia1 space and an adequate uudersllnWng of illdividual .... 
heterogeneous beings, we need 'e begin with the individual, and .pecifically 
with a relational con<cption of the individual. I funher dev""'" this 
conceptiun in the following '.OIiDD by introducing 8n ideotily analysis of 
complex individuals which emphasi:.es how they are aDd are not affected by 
social interaction. 
THE IDENTITY OF COMPLEX INDIVIDUALS 
Since the relational conception deline. individual. iu term. af their relations 
10 others, and .in.e individual, have many different kinds of relalion. /0 
others. they ate complex in the first inst""". in virtue of hving many 
different kinds of (incommen ...... bl.) connections to others, whether d,es. 
connectioos are market relations,. organizational ties:, 80cint relationships, cw. 
Individual. thus understood might be said 10 have multiple selves. a concept 
thaI was o.iginally developed in conneclion witb the atomistic indiYidual 
cODception and the idea thai solitary individual. CQuld conceivtlbly have 
multiple utility limolio". (for exa'uple Elster, 1979; compare Davis. 2003, eh. 
4). If we give up the utility function idea, and [.,.appropria .. the multiplo 
.elv •• coneept for the relational conceplion, indivi<tual, wonld then be 
underamod to have mlJltiple selves in virbJ.e of 'heir having multiple 
c01lllec.ion& to olhero. This alternstive unde .. tandiD£: tr"al. individual.' 
couneclion. ro oth ... as connections they have to social group., so that their 
multiple .elve. are then associated with their different social identities, thus 
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linking their locations in differenl social networkll tu their being members of 
different sncial groups. Of collI'Se tbere are limitations to seeing individual.' 
.ocial network locations 85 soei.l group .ffili.lion.s, and ind<ed also 
limitations to the idea of 8 social group itself. reflecting problems involved in 
determining what CObStitutes • social group and what constitnte, membership 
in a 50ci.al group. But J put tbese problems aside here to focus on how 
1ndtvjdu.als ha.y.ng different social identities J.uakc tile,,}'), cClmpl=x 
individuals.' 
The idea of" 'sodlll grollP' itselris • cw...ificalion category differentially 
constructed in social scienc~ public administration, and popular discourse. 
fram.d in third person object Language, which orders individuals by .ets of 
characteri.tics interpreted .s shared, and which ascrib •• to individuals seen 
lIS having the characteristics appropriate to particular social groups the status 
of having membership in iliose groups. Th. ide. of 'group membership" 
then, is simply that ofboing 8J1 ilem in a 0<1 or being an object with B certain 
c1toracterislie that causes it and all other things baving that same 
charaeteristic til belong to that set. Thus individuals' mwtipl. ..lv •• 
und=tODd as their .ocial identities constitute different 'object 
c1toracteri2alions' of individuals that on the relational conception of 
individuals nlust b. part of their general definition .. < individuals_ But it i. 
01.0 pm! of the id •• of"" individual that individuals are not only obj..,t" but 
ore in Some undeflDcd .ense 'agent.' a.. well, so thai on the mlational 
conception an ind[vidual i.s complex uotjU!t in having many social identities 
and relation. to othell!, but al." in being both an agent Rod 6n object (or 00 
object in •• many o.nsc, as the individual has social identities). I distinguish 
these two "speets of complcx individuals in Icrms of the two ways the 
co~pt orideotiey can be applied 10 them. 
Tbe individual'. object chancleri.zation as • group member - Dr object 
identity - as i. refleeted in aU the different ways in which individuals are 
classified in social group taxonomies by social scientis", public authorities, 
and in the many fo""," of ,ocial discourse - thus rather their many object 
identities - may be referred to as a person's set 61' 'IJdMtiual identili .... The 
social t;rounds for the cOIlS~lution of. person'. differenl individW!l. identitles 
in the contemporary world arc fontilior and numerous; tax and Rocial 
contribution requirements,lesal re.ponsibility detenninalion. market conm.:t 
compliaDC':. peDHion HDd social services delivery, medical treatment .. credit 
rating, rights elaboration, education and training "".luatieD, birth and death 
verification, e'perimenlill invesligation, and so on in an essentiaUy 
IInbounded liot. All explain individW!l. identity (in difF~rent .nd nfllen 
"soenUally inCDllll1IenSlU'&te ways) by asenoing to indjvidu.1s membership in 
calegories constructed to represent different social group aggregate •. 
COlTe'l'onding 10 these diffim:nt forms of individual identity. moreover, there 
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ex.ists 8 varielY of &continuity" ncking technologies used to opera.tlonlliUl 
Ihe.e different individ .... 1 identities in the face nf <l>nstanl chl1I1se in 
irutividunl chamclwtics: IIBIII£S, numb... ...ignmenis, individualized 
records of all kinds, family de.scen~ curriculum vilae, photographs, biometric 
measures (fingerprints, DNA idcntifio&.tion, dental records, brain scans. iris 
scans), surveillance, and incarceration nr institutionalization. As socialll"oup 
,.te&orics are tools dC'.sIg.ucd fOI the WBJ.l.B.SClllcnt of hctcrogcueou5 
populations Df individuals according 10 functiODlll "Iation.hips believed to 
obtain bclweOll them, the us. of these tools requires Ihore bo practical 
working system, for lI,.,i. consistent application. Consi'lency in thi. regard i. 
a mailer of being able to continue applying a given categolY to individual. as 
long as they ,atisfy il. requirements, e.pecially when th .... i. change in their 
other chsracteristic •. 
Di,cussionl of indlvUlual identity in philosophy (lIBditionlLlly thought tc 
be the subjeot domain in which identity questions particularly conceming 
individuals are systematically invealigaled) usWIIly explain the concept DC 
individual continuiry in terms of characteristics of ILhistorical, socially 
isolated individu.ols {for example, continuit;y of psychological slales), and lIot 
surprisingly frame Ihis as • qu •• tion of 'personal' idenlit;y. However, the 
relatinnal cnnceptiQR of the individual. as furmulated in terms of individuals. 
having many ,oeiat idelltitie.a, naturally tums lIur attontinn to tho numerous 
practical "y.terns for addre ... ing continuity of individual identity that have 
long been in place in the world. Here wo find no. only en cst.bti,lred general 
principle for explaining individual idenrity as continuity through change, 
IIl1Dlely, on.taioed membenhip in a group that can be repres.aled by a social 
category. bu. also a rich variery of soeial practices have been developed to 
operationalize thi. principle. Thus, in IlKldem hisloty at leaBl, the origins of 
th~ concept of individual identity appear historically priOI'" to the origins of 
the concept of personal identity. Indeed philosophers generally date the 
origin of 'persollal ideuti\y' .. a distinct question of investigation to Ihe late 
seventeenth century work of John Locke, who is said to bave given the first 
O)IDma.ic account of personal ichmti\y (s... Noonan, 1989; Locke 1975 
[L6g4]). ThWl~ if we follow this historical pmgres!tion. and emphaRize Ihe 
soci.l p"",tic •• mod.1 for labeling, cat.go.mng, ""d tracking iruiividu.I., we 
ought to inve,tigole and explain the concept of peISDoal idenli\y as an 
extension at'Jd dev.lopmen[ afthe concept of individual identi\y. 
How, then, should the concept of personal identity to be understood? IhI'" 
.. sume that there i. something rnore to individUAls than just their m!lny 
individual Qr object identities:. given the. dilll:us!I;ion abDve. \Ve might flIlce it to 
arise in the ronn of personal principles of individll8l conlinui\y which 
individuals themselve. ,eek 10 implement is analogues to the InIc:king 
pracllees and individual iclelltity at.gories they see applied 10 themselves in 
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social group clas.ifioation systems. From this perspective, Ibe concept of 
p.rsonal Ide"1/1)! emers •• os a category that individuals themselves manAge 
when the... atready eJdst systems of """ial categories constnlGted for 
managing people's yarious individual identities. A coru:cru. wilh pers<mal 
identity is thus A ",1.liYely recent hi.tories! development that ",flee,", the 
emergence of individual idtutily sysloms and tIl.ir tracking tecllllologios. 
'But whereas social lracking Icclmologies have mulijplled, and hove now 
become increasingly sQpI!isticated, it is hard to .ay what tracking 
technologies 8IIalogous [lerxonal principles of individual continuity or 
persoaal identity misht a!temp! to employ, Indeed individuals go,"""lIy""" 
social tntelring Iechnalogie$ (their n8l1les, their family d •• cent, curriculum 
vitae, etc.) Lo represent their personal identities ()f 'who' lhey think they arc, 
Following CWk (1997), iD.dividuals appear to rely 011 these social tracking 
II:chnalogies as exlen1a1 •• affolding that !hey till. to manage their persooal 
ideDtities. ThaI is. they recogniu the concept of their personal identity .. 
dllltillCt limn their voriollS individual identities, but they lack D1C111S of 
operationaHziDI! the cIlIlCeJIL' 
What does this Ie.Ive us to saY. then. ahaut how individllals IIIIUla£c their 
own p .... DD.1 identities? 0 .... Ihing that _ clear is thaI, if tho concept of 
personal idelility is taken to be an hi9!orical IIJUllogne 10 socially aoo.'IliluIed 
individual ideality systems, then it may also b. distinguished ftom them 
.ystema by its being a se/f-rerereucing or reflexive ""e of oeIivity, Social 
systems that manage different iodMduai idontitias _ them as object 
identities distinct from Ihe processes involved in the calegDrization, labeling. 
and tracking of indi viduals. In cClllrasl, individuals who mlltlllge their 
~eT!"'ns1 identiti.,. !reat Ibcsc identities sa identical with tbem.oelvllII, that ... 
•• their "own' pelSODal identities thai are differcnl in their view Bom the 
individual iw.ntities Ibat olhers creale fur them. More fully, the activity 
individual. cngoge in when m.aagulg Ibeir personal identities might be seen 
AI n self-orgl1lli'Zing or sdf-reprrodJidng m:tMty. Indeed, .inc" !he social 
practices that classiiY individual. into soci!! grl)llpll liagm ... 1 them as single 
individuals, the taslr of individuals if they im: 1Il oct un 8 concept cf 
themselves is to produce thai cnncept for themselves, We mny lake this ideo 
also to underlie the standllId charftcterization oC individuals Il& ".gonlJl'. 
Agent. IIrC usually defined os entities whos~ hoh.vior determines cveals 
ra!her than is determined by events. Sioce reflexive entiti.s lire in some 
sense self-determining, they C81lll0l be mlly detennined by events. and this 
allows for the possJbilJty (if does Dot guarBDt •• ) thot their behavi<>r 
d.tclIllin •• events. Thua we may also asso<.;alo the idea of the individual 
being an aclive agent with the historie eme,,&ence of the per.oDal ideotity 
concept. 
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Individuals, then, mwmize their own personal identitiet. using backing 
~chnoloiies that derive 170m different social cOIISln1I:tions oflltoir individual 
identitie" To express IhiB in renns of the lClational conception of lite 
individual set follh above. couid ... the market as on. basis tOr the social 
cOllslruclion of individual identities in tennS of the individual identity 
categom..1icn. assigned 10 morket participants. In neoclassical economics, 
markets are e1ie'YWMre tho same IS a single ""l'ply-and-dumand process, ""d 
mark.et participants are accordingly frozen in a singl. individual identity 
which the theory coustructs in the arumi.ti. terms it ••• igns to isol.ted 
rational llUIXimlzen;. Tn <onlJast, con.ider Mirowslci's evolutiooary-
cGmplexity-computational appronch 10 markets. the marlr.oma'" cOIIc.ptlon 
(Mirow.ki, 2007), Sinoe markets .s mnrkmnat. an: evclywhere diverse and 
COrt1ple~, market participants - or the individual identities that participation 
in mar~IS thus understood enl3;Js - must also be everywhere diffiorent and 
heterogeneous, Markets IS marlr.omata are IJJlkJ:d and interrelated by IIu: 
different kinds of iDfomIalioD they ""ccpt ftom othllr marltclli lIS 
complllati"",,1 iopalS, so that mal'kc" constitute nodes of " complex 
infumolional network. dlal can be cIIoraclerized in Iemls of different 
overlapping and hieral'chical rolatioosbips. Accordingly individual market 
)JIIrIicipants, or their individual identities, muot aloo he reialotlll> one another 
in a complex informational network .imilocly chlracteri:zcd by different .sets 
of overlappil1ll alld hicnucbical relation..hips In other individuals, This is the 
Sl!IDe ..... pecl in which individ",d. are characterized as complex 011 the 
relational cOI'ICCption oC the individual as sel ont abow, 
But if this provides an .volutionary-compleltity~omput~tional 
llnders!ll!lding of tho individual ideatities of IWI/'kel participants. how do we 
nndersutnd the personal identity of market participants JI .... lIIl whal tfu:y 
them •• lve. manage and produce? Not. fir.t ti,., ftom the Deoclassical view 
Ibi. que,tioD doe! not arise. beC8U!ie individual, are explained ... tiroly in 
reJ1Ili of their indi,·idu.1 object identitic,,- Since there is but one iadivi"""l 
identity fOT munt participants in but one kind of markel form (the supply-
and-demand modo!), th .... is no questiOf! of organizing a collection ofpluml 
individual identities for IIu: indi,ojdu.a11D address. lbi. is ""nsi.lent with ",hat 
I have previously argued OIl Ibi. subject (Davis, 2003), nlDllcly, thaI per..,nal 
identity cannot be explaiaed in noochrssiarl economics, either in terms of illl 
_Ii"" subjectivist individual cOdcq:Joon or in terms of what laler nepllc;ed 
thai c:on«ption. Ihe abStract individual conception. The abstract individual 
concq:Jtion can be applied equany to iadividnal •• gmops of individuals, the 
different seh'cs or individuals, a.nimals, and DOD.-ti~-ing entices; ChUB it eannot 
refer to the sinale individual, and ils adoption effectively eliminates the 
individual !Tom ecnnomic Iheory.' In terms of the ""atmc"! of ideotity here:, 
then, the DDly accounl of individuals neocl ... kal theory po.,es ••• is it, 
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individual "bjed identity chMlclerm.tion of market participants. 
However, the markomat. evollltioDary..eomplcxity-compulotional view 
docs: provide an undersr.'lnding of personal identity u a sclf-organizing or 
self-reproducing kiud of activity in which individuals engage as an analogue 
to the market .oeial process that continually constructs individual identities 
for them as marker participants. Thai is, u muke'" pmliferate, and a& this 
Huci.! proc... multiplies market participants' individual identilles, so 
individlJ.9.l, have an ever more tangible problem of constructing theirpersooal 
identiti.s. From Mirow,Iti'. view, mark.ts .. markomala are understood as .. 
form of awomata, as in VDn NCUIDlU:W.'JS theoIY of automata,. wbere auton18.la 
are •• If-reproducing cntitie. who.e e.olution can gene""" more complex 
fonns of themselves in tcnn. of poss •• ,ing greater compUlalion.o.l capacily 
(see Mirowlki, 2002). ParaUel 10 tru" individuals' self-organizing activilY 
seen particularly in the sense ef a •• If-reproducing !dnd of IUltivity mimics 
&rid reinfOTce, the ,clf-tepmduction pro""". of marke .. , since an inere .. ing 
<omplexity of markets in lerms of grea.er computational capacity need., to be 
"""omp.nied by an increasing capacity for coll"lpieJ<i1y on the part of 
individual. as markel participants able 10 .eif-organi:ze themselve. in such a 
market system. This i. nol to say lhat individuals in their petlon .. 1 identity 
COD.bw:lioD proc ••••• are to b. taken a. Turing Machin •• or other types of 
artificial intelligencc systems. AI. Clark (200S, 27) says, 'we shauldn't be 
fO(lled inio mistaking the basic apparatWl of Ihe Turill[l Machine for an 
e.plan.tion (at any "",,IiJ.J. level uf abstraction) of the way biological braiDS 
support ration.1 thought'. Indeed, on the evolutionary tlMerstandiog here uf 
individuals and markels, both have e.senlislly opcn~d.d capIUlitie. for .elf-
reproduction made additionally complex by tbeir oo-evnlution. 
This evolut!onary..:omplexity-eompulmonal relational conception of th. 
individual can be comp...,d 10 Pons's view. Polt9 explains the bolerogeneity 
of individuals in teEm! of the diffcr<ntialed character of a non-Euclidian 
space, SD that there is nothing ill the interactions belWeen indiyidualg !hili 
contributes to their beltrageneity, oad they ano thus only incidentally 
differenli.toel from one another, and dot differentia/ed in "'rms of their Dwn 
characleri,tic., Prom this view, how.ver, individWl]" differeD! inleractions in 
markets produ •• diffenont individual idenlities as msrlcct participants, which 
senerale different self-organizinglself-reproducing activilies in different 
individuals. Individuals are consequently difi ..... nt in themselves in a non-
incidental sen,e. I hav. temred this cllnCeptiun " complex individual 
conception, because the cboructeristics 'hal coo,titul. different individuals 
are incommensur.at~ a.nd cannot b. I"lIdw::m to one another. Though 
individuals share a p'''Dnal idClllity principle, it I.c:ks a single conlent aero •• 
individuals thai would allow us to describe individuals .11 in the ,arne w.y. 
This crunpk:x individual conception, 1 suggest:. is the concept,nn appropria~ 
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to a non-Euelidiaa view of space and an evolutiolloty-cOlnplexily· 
computationalapproacb to individuals. Potts indeed re .. oos in terms oInon-
Euclidian Sp"'c<, but his adoption of an atomistic individual conception 
produce, what might be termed a neo-Euclidianism Ib,t emphasize, path-
dependency of well-formed atoms - a modest change in dynamical thinking 
that lad .. real nov.lty and emergence. 
COM.TvIENTS ON SOCIAL ECONOM1C POLICY TOWARDS 
Th.'DIVIDUALS 
Here I make Ode commenl regarding normalivo implicaliOIl5 of lb. cOlnplcK 
individuals conception. JUSI as !he traditional atomistic indi"i dual conceptiou 
supports a set of nQmlative arguments. especially Wl assllciated. with 
efficiency judgments, so u,., compl." illdividuals conceplion suppor .. a •• t of 
normative argument!, though ones that involve an allagedler diffel .. nt 
conception of individual well-being. From Ihe standard viewpoin~ change. in 
markets arc recommended th.t increose efficiency by enebling individuals to 
achie". higher levels of utilily. This view is nlren •• ,oeiated with the idea 
Ibat alomi!!!ic individuals pos •••• determinate utility Iim.tions with which 
Ihey ore identified. In the complex individual. con<eption. however, 
individuals do nol have given utility functions. At a giveo poinl in time and 
from Ihe perspective of a particular individual idenlity. ooe migbl 
approximate individuals' interests with son,. such functional repreoonl.LioD, 
but this would produce a partial representation of the individual benet 
characterized as one of an individual's multiple sclves. Vel.s the multiple 
selves problem seen as a multiple utility funclion problem .ollIlol be resolved 
in tbe staadard framework, even partial representations of individuals in 
utility function lerms are 10 be avoided. 
The cc.mplcl< individuals account here rel',esent, individuals in lerm' of 
their .elf-organizing/.elf-reproducing activity. Thi. 'production' 
Wldentaading of the individual does oat I~nd ilself to tbe ide. of ,atisfying 
some funttional stale, but mther underlies: the idea of individuals as agents. 
What view of individual well-boing doe. this then SIIpport? Since individuals 
.'e inescapably heterogeneous· from thi, viewpoint, 1 "'Sges! that il support. 
treating diversity and difference as • normative ideal along .ide other 
measures of well-being ... ociated with fairness and equality .s apply to 
.h.",d individual identities. The sooial systel1l5 thai .ategorize individual. in 
terms of their membership in social grnull!ll have as: implidt normative 
principles equal aDd fair treatment of all iDdividuals who fall withio an 
established categol)'. By ils very nsture, tm, object idenlity bureaucratization 
principle disregards differences between individual •. Moreover, as social 
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categori7.3tion syslems are often lom;ely integJ1lted~ thleTe are few normative 
principle... tltdt apply III individuals aero •• tlteir mlllnpl. individual identities. 
As a principle of tlti. oor! folio outside the individual identity system, and is 
associated with individuals' analogue self-organbing concerns, it seems it 
accordingly constitu.e. a principle ~Iat mak.e. individual diversity and 
differeDco a normative ideal. 
Note that recent evolu.tionuy"cDmplex.ity-c:oldpl1taliotlal IhinlcinS in 
economics has yet to do much 10 tOllllul.tc nOIIll&tive WIIccpls and policy 
prescription.. Indeed, thaI ,imuhoLion melhod& cre.te .., mOllY different 
possible world Bcenario~ selMl& to undercut the Dntire jdee. of a normative 
'tance toward the economy. AI the same time, " principle Df individual 
diversity and difference as an ide.l plays DO role elsewhe ... ID contemporary 
economic9. Oddly., outside or ~~[)nomics:, divef'Gily of individuals 8., a 
DOI1J)a.ive ideal is commonly defended. This chapter snggcsls rhot Ibi, ide.1 
can ploy a role in eeonomics in an evolutioDaty-complmdty-eomput&lioDBI 
type of approach tltat differentiate. the different aspecl. of tbe identity of 
individuals, and rccogDizcs petSon.1 identity as a central componeDt of any 
account of individuals. 
NOTES 
I Dchrcu"s (19S9) llJUmprion of. ctm'lpl.tk:: se~ GffOl'1lJ8mnwilclll mr 411 nmc. is: a panidtG'll4tic 
cxp~siMl CJf mIl:. Bar Dmcm Cll!'Cful .blHll mm lIXiummc fClundirialll aft: alBa Cllpricit abDul 
the- real fiekl iI5 &he Ipill:C 111 which camomic CJr.pLlDatiomo CIXIII'. Sec:: !he currcqt ledn! 
i1dYiULccd.micn.lct'unomic: h:JtL MU-CoLcLl (19&5, xiv-xvi). 
2; ( ar."t in 0",,,,,, (206l) rbar th~ rleat.llSJIiul aklmiu oonccptioo nf'the ilidividuElI doc; nol 
ItatisfY r.:.uDnAh'.: tlrittriA ftl:.:dM 10 idmrify individuals IS dildlld and relltively atdllri8B 
c .. li~cs. arod ace~rdi!:lsly fail!: as t. .c:MCcprilm DIan individllD.l. 
;I Th.iI is Ihc fttllrrnaL ar mlil1 CL$ot ~ e:r.biblu:d iD. spc:c:clJ ad behavior. OlipLiciLQWII 1Nc--.nlcll(i~. 
in whieb the indi\lidWlo\ pnv.aie:ly dtGlt:.t me .shared quality of an exprC&&ed OT 1cn()Wn wt;. 
inteDlion..Jm dorivali\le 1ItIm aod dqlend (111 thfl exiJl~tc oftbc RLIIin CISC . 
.. For dnte qU:tte differel1' WHYS: il:l wh.lt:h the concept tlf IOCidl iden:liry hi9 been iftlroduo~ tnfQ 
ecDJIDnUt: mod~&, !leI! Da.vis (2006a). 
J Here t da not attempt to explain this apparent '*:una other tlwI. to say Ihu ir mLgbt be UlU.ed 
that filliit PCrIfIP ,ingu.m .!Ipeech. whith i&. I.pprClprlale to a pmcmil idt;nriry discourse, IIIIC:ks. ll1e 
same ayste:mi.tic el.baration atl'a.rdcd by third persaD speech \lSed III ~lLamctllrize, individu:t1 
i:~ndl'y_ 
G This ell:tCeption of the individ.ual is anriciplreri in prewar opcmlians; t9e11fC1h. tbllUlry. a mixed 
IXIIlt!ctiou of dccluon·makmg; tculr. ml:aD.t tCI bid UllC:U. bY' CXpllll'ii in III ,..,idc [lillie c>f ap'plicatioD5 
dlllt illvolvc compleJ. &IrB.Ee,l!lic coordiDUlwo prcbLeuLlt (ilte MI,l)Wslcl, 2002. cb. 4). 
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